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LEGAL PROBLEMS IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
Jerome F. Leavell*
INTRODUCTION
We can either preserve the ancient laws that guarantee the in-
violability of the dead and the present rights of the next of kin,
or we can rewrite those laws in favor of the living. Neither
course is politically easy; but we have no third choice. If we
want to preserve our present law, we must also accept poor but
costly substitutes for natural spare parts. Many may feel that
this comes within a hairsbreadth of saying that the rights of the
dead take precedence over the rights of the living; they may
feel that such an argument is already as outmoded as the argu-
ments of the early anti-anatomists. If enough people come to
feel this way, the laws will be changed.,
The foregoing comment was made only months prior to the introduction
of the Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 2 during August, 1968. 3 The Uni-
form Act was drafted by Professor E. Blythe Stason of Michigan Law
School, and further developed during 3 years of study. With the en-
dorsement of both the American Bar Association4 and the American
Medical Association, it has now been adopted by all but three states,
as well as the District of Columbia.5
Although Mississippi has not adopted the Uniform Act, its statute,
enacted in 1970,6 is quite similar to the Uniform Act, and will therefore
be applicable to the following discussion.
*Associate Professor, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law. B.A., LL.B.. 1951, J.D. 1969, University of Mississippi; LL.M. 1965, J.S.D. 1972,
Yale. Ford Fellow, Oxford (Balliol); Inner Temple (London-Hon.).
ILONGMORE, SPARE-PART SURGERY 179 (1968).
2The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is com-
posed of three lawyers or judges from each state, chosen by their Governor for 3-
year terms. Their function is to make state laws more uniform and relevant. At their
annual meeting they review proposed drafts of model or uniform acts prepared by their
subcommittees. The subcommittee which developed the U.A.G.A. [also cited as the
Uniform Act] was composed of E. Blythe Stason (Michigan); David R. Bishop
(Michigan); Hugh N. Clayton (Mississippi); Douglas Keedie (Arizona), and Richard
Rabbit (Missouri).
sArkansas Democrat, Jan. 1, 1969, at 3A.
4The U.A.G.A. was endorsed by the Amercan Bar Association on August 7, 1968.
5Council of State Governments, BOOK OF THE STATES 1970-71 (1970).
6MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 278.3-01 to -09 (Supp. 1970).
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This article primarily concerns the problems of "consent" and "li-
ability" in relation to the Uniform Act and the similar Mississippi
statute. Hopefully it will provide insight into a virtually unknown, but
increasingly important, area.
The fundamental principle permeating the Uniform Act is that a
person should be able to control the disposition of his own body, or any
part of it, upon death, without geographical limitation.. Furthermore,
the Uniform Act is the first attempt to standardize criteria relative to this
problem and to protect doctors who wish to procure and use human
tissues.
Section 2 of the Uniform Act allows persons who are 18 years of age
or older and of sound mind to execute an anatomical gift. The age limita-
tion reflects a growing tendency to place adult responsibility at a younger
age and considerably enlarges the potential number of primary donors.
Additionally, under section 2, the survivors may make the gift immedi-
ately before death or thereafter. These survivors are classed in a hierarchy
which provides levels of donative authority. The specific hierarchy of
survivors authorized to make the gift, when those of a previous class are
unobtainable, will materially reduce the loss of critical time. The physic-
ian will thus be reassured that the person making the post-mortem gift
has been authorized to do so. The rights of the donee are made supreme
to all others except for the state's right of autopsy. This supremacy pro-
vision reasonably insures the physician donee that the gift cannot be
countermanded by the survivors of the donor.7 Mississippi's donative
authority is found in section 278.3-01 of the Mississippi Code and its
provisions are similar to the Uniform Act, except that the donative age
is 21 years. In addition, the Mississippi statute does not insure that sur-
vivors cannot revoke the gift, although it does stipulate that the survivors
cannot make a donation in violation of the decedent's instructions or
known wishes to the contrary.
Section 7 of the Uniform Act clearly outlines the privileges and obli-
gations of all parties upon the death of the donor. The donee may reject
or accept the gift, and provisions are made to include the interests of
the survivors in providing the body for memorial services, where not
precluded by the terms of the gift. When only a part is donated, the
donee is obligated to remove it without unnecessary mutilation and give
7As a practical matter however, a survivor might still defeat an organ gift by
advising the transplant physician that the authorization has been revoked by the
donor in a then unavailable document or by an unrecorded statement. See Randall
& Randall, The Developing Field of Human Organ Tranvplantation, 5 GONZACA
L. REV. 20 (1969).
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custody of the remains to next of kin for burial. Also under section 7,
several other important rights are delineated, especially in the area of
the physician's liability. The donee acquires absolute ownership of the
body or part specified in the gift, and is free from legal liability unless
he acts without good faith, mutilates the body, or exceeds the terms of
the gift.
Another important provision, which is provided in section 4, is that
the physician in attendance at death who certifies the death may not par-
ticipate in removal or transplantation. An obvious conflict of interest
would result otherwise.8 Additionally, the determination of death is left
to medical authorities. Artificial legal standards cannot easily be applied
to a problem about which there is significant medical difference of opin-
ion. The physician will doubtlessly judge death by the equipment and
current standards at his command, without concerning himself with
whether he is satisfying a static statutory definition. One who acts in
good faith, pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Act, is relieved of
liability, either civil or criminal, for such acts.
. The Mississippi statute9 contains similar provisions, and, in addi-
tion, relieves the liability of those who act in "good faith" and without
"notice of revocation." Furthermore, a person who "unknowingly fails
to -carry out the wishes of the donor" is protected.'0 The Mississippi stat-
ute provides protection only in civil cases, however; it does not mention
criminal actions.. Mississippi has further settled certain conflicts of law
problems by recognizing gifts executed in other jurisdictions."
sSee Couch, Curran, & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantation,
271 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 681 (1964).
9Section 278.3-06 of the Mississippi Code provides:
(a) The donee may accept or reject the gift. When the gift is only part of
the body, promptly following removal of the part named, custody of the re-
maining parts of the body shall be transferred to the next of kin or other
person or agency authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body. The
time of death shall be determined by the physician in attendance upon the
donor's terminal illness or certifying his death, and said physician shall not
be a member of the team of physicians which transplants the part to an-
other individual.
(b) A person who, in good faith and acting in reliance upon and authoriza-
tion made under provisions of this act and without notice of revocation
thereof, takes possession of, performs surgical operations upon, or removes
tissue, substances or parts from the human body; or refuses such a gift; or any
person who knowingly fails to carry out the wishes of the donor according to
the provisions of this act, shall not be liable for damages in a civil action
brought against him for such act.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 278.3-06 (a) & (b) (Supp. 1970).
loMiss. CODE ANN. § 278.3-06 (b) (Supp. 1970).
"iMiss. CODE ANN. § 278.3-04 (e) (Supp. 1972).
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Although there are other provisions in both the Uniform Act and
the Mississippi statute, they are not pertinent to the remaining discus-
sion.
THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT
A. Consent of the Donor
As the skills of transplant teams increase and the rejection problem
is gradually eliminated, more organs should become available for tran -
plantation. The early transplants of vital organs were usually paired
kidneys from living donors. Kidneys were transplanted because the living
donor had two kidneys, but could function satisfactorily with one. Since
the rejection factors were high, donors were generally limited to mem-
bers of the family, where tissues were more easily and productively
matched. Because these negative factors are now being reduced, more
organs are naturally coming from cadaver donors, with, of course, the
additional ethical advantage of their having no need of these replace-
ment parts. Consequently, the problems peculiar to living donors are
also becoming proportionately less significant. Nevertheless, since it is in
keeping with traditional societal and legal concepts of the sacredness of
the individual, and since the Uniform Act and the other gift statutes do
not deal with living donors, the issue of adequacy of consent must con-
tinue to occupy a position of priority until the problem has been com-
pletely resolved by medical progress.
The physician must obtain consent from both the donor and the re-
cipient for such surgical procedures.' 2 The physician's concern is wheth-
er the consent is of sufficient validity to protect him from civil and crim-
inal liability. As a starting premise it seems to be accepted that if the
procedure consented to has a recognized and accepted "therapeutic"
purpose, no liability per se should attach to the physician's invasion of
the patient's person in an attempt to achieve that end. Since organ trans-
plants are now usually within this definition, ordinarily the medical per-
12A suggestion on donor forms is provided by Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and
Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 442 (1965).
Consent evidently makes lawful all minor therapeutic procedures of a cosmetic nature,
such as removal of skin blemishes, teeth straightening, tatooing, and perforation of
ear lobes. Myers, Aspects of Private and Public Law Regarding the Human Body
from the Medico-Legal Standpoint 242, 1968 (unpublished dissertation in University
of Edinburgh Library), citing Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defense of Consent,
81 S.A.L.J. 344 (1964). The removal of naturally replaceable or repairable tissues,
such as blood transfusions and skin grafts, also does not create any particular prob-
lem where consent is obtained. Id. at 242, citing Forbes, Legal Aspects of Blood Trans-
fusion and of Therapy in General, 4 MEa. Sci. L. 26 (1964).
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sonnel performing the operation will be protected, provided the consent
obtained is "informed" and "voluntary" and the consenting party is leg-
ally competent.'8
In discussing the aspects of informed consent, the California Court
of Appeals in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr.,14 declared:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects him-
self to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the
proposed treatment. Likewise, the physician may not minimize
the known dangers of a procedure or operation in order to in-
duce his patient's consent. At the same time, the physician must
place the welfare of his patient above all else and this very fact
places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose
between two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to
the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure
or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in
alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who
as a result refuses to undertake surgery in which there is in fact
a minimal risk; it may also result in actually increasing the risks
by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself.
The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate
problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is
important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in dis-
cussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must
be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts neces-
sary to informed consent.
When the recipient of a vital organ transplant is to receive a func-
tioning organ, he will surely die after his own diseased organ is removed,
unless, as in the case of a kidney, he can be sustained by a machine until
another donor can be found. The preparations for such risk-ridden pro-
cedures are thus made in an artificial environment charged with emotion
and tension. 15 Therefore, the recipient's (or his proxy's) consent requires
an even greater degree of understanding to be intelligently given. This is
a matter of subjectivity and perforce must vary somewhat with the facts
and circumstances of each case. While the statement that informed con-
sent is a prerequisite to such a radical surgical procedure does not admit
13"There is some question, however, whether the donor is acting free of coercive
forces. The donor is subjected to extreme psychological and emotional pressure;
inherent in his opportunity to save the life of a friend or relative, but despite the
existence of such moral pressures practice has established the fact that fully informed
adults are sufficiently free of coercion to give valid consent." Beecher, Some Falla-
cies and Errors in the Application of the Principle of Consent in Human Experi
mentation, 3 CLIN. PHAR. & THER. 141 (1962).
14154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957).
'5Medical Experiment Insurance, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 965, 977 (1970).
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of argument, it is difficult, if not impossible, to define the limits of the
information required for such consents. It is clearly necessary to admit
the limitations of the mechanism of informed consent, 16 but it is equally
unavailing and counter-productive to attempt to go beyond it for a pref-
erable, workable alternative. Conceding this, the best test for validity of
consent appears to be the customary and flexible "reasonable man"
standard. Was the patient (or his proxy) informed of all of the material
facts that a "reasonable man" would have wanted to know before making
an intelligent choice? Was the individual given full opportunity to exer-
cise his own independent judgment as to whether or not to participate? 17
If so, then no liability should ensue with respect to the organ recipient.
With respect to the donor, the considerations, while analogous in
part, are somewhat different because of the inducement factors.. The con-
sent does not involve the same factors as would a normal "self-thera-
peutic" operative procedure. Most importantly, it may be difficult to
show that the operation provides any benefit to the donor.' 8 The high
probability of satisfactory existence with one kidney presumably explains
why legal liability has not been imposed for such organ removals. 19 The
typical response, especially in the case of the "family" donor, is that the
risk to him is relatively slight compared to the certain death and loss of a
loved one; therefore, the obvious consideration and benefit to the donor
is years of love and affection from the recipient if the operation is suc-
cessful.
lsMyers, supra note 12, at 345.
17"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in dam-
ages." Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 221 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1919).
'SOne major difficulty should be considered. In the human body there are
two kidneys. If one is injured the second carries on the entire metabolite
function of both kidneys with no resultant harm to the individual. However,
if a donor, who is left with only one kidney, subsequently suffers damage to
his remaining kidney, he is in the same position as the recipient of his kid-
ney and is a candidate for transplant himself. Thus, there is a definite danger
in giving a kidney and the donor must be so advised.
Woodside, Organ Transplantation: The Doctor's Dilemma and the Lawyer's Respon-
sibility, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 66, 73 (1970).
'ONevertheless, it is a substantial sacrifice, particularly for patients donating
a kidney to one of many children. A mother has obligations not only to the
child with renal failure, but to her other healthy children. Although one kid-
ney will sustain life normally and indefinitely, there is the risk that disease
or injury will affect the remaining organ. The ethical questions involved in
asking a minor to give a kidney to a brother or cousin have become so com-
plex that it is no longer practiced in most centers.
Dunphy, The Story of Organ Transplantation, 21 HAsr. L.J. 67, 71 (1969).
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Though these paired organ removals cannot be performed without
some risk,20 at least to the extent the donor is subjected to the rigors
of a severe surgical trauma and elimination of his reserve, 21 few legal
disputes have actually arisen regarding liability to the donor. Some il-
lumination was provided in this area not long ago in three landmark
Massachusetts Declaratory Judgment actions- (1) Masden v. Harrison,22
(2) Husky v. Harrison,23 and (3) Foster v. Harrison.24 All three cases
concerned the consent of a minor to donate a kidney for his identical
twin who suffered from fatal renal disease. In each case a hospital sought
the court declarations prior to proceeding with kidney substitution. The
three cases involved donations where consent was given by both the
children (teenage youths of ages 19, 14, and 14) and their parents (or
guardians). The issue was the competence or capacity of the consenting
parties. 25 Were these consents of such legal efficacy as to protect the hos-
pital and surgeons from liability for civil and criminal assault and bat-
tery?
The court declared that the hospital would incur no liability if the
operation was required to save the sick twin and if the healthy twin
(donor) knew all of the consequences before consenting. Based on the
testimony of a psychiatrist that if the sick twin should die the resulting
emotional disturbance ("grave emotional impact") could affect the
health and well-being of the donor twin for life, the court concluded
that the operation was for the benefit, if only psychological, of the
20A most important aspect of the use of a living donor is the risk to such donor
upon the removal of one of his two normal kidneys. The risk can be described in
two components: one, the immediate risk of operation; and two, the long-range risk of
living with one healthy kidney rather than with two. Both of these risks are small and
hard to assess precisely; however, the following statements can he made. To date, over
650 such operations have been performed with no known fatalities or permanent
disabilities. The immediate risk of such ill effects therefore is low, but it is doubtful
that the figure will remain at zero forever. Stickel, Organ Transplantation in Medi-
cal and Legal Perspectives, MEDICAL PROCRFSS AND THE LAW 40 (1970).
2lWoodside, supra note 18, at 74.
22No. 68651 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957).
2sNo. 68666 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Sept. 14, 1957).
24No. 68674 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957).
25The problem becomes more complex when one deals with donations of a
kidney from a minor since the minor, of course, is incapable of consent. The
parent can consent to the operation on a minor, even though it would cer-
tainly not be for the benefit of the donor child; but because of the potential
liability involved in such an operation, most surgeons refuse to take an organ
from a minor without a court order.
Richards, Medical-Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 21 HAsT. L.J. 77, 84
(1969).
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donor..26 Thus, the operation was for the continued good health and well-
being of the healthy twin.27 Apparently, the only other American case
in point is Bonner v. Moran.28 There the physician removed some skin
for a graft from a boy, aged 15, for the benefit of a badly burned cousin.
The donor was taken to the physician by an aunt and there gave his
consent. His mother was never told of the operation. Later the boy be-
came ill and suffered a permanent scar. The federal appeals court found
that a surgical operation was a technical battery, and as such was ex-
cusable only by the consent of the parents. In such a situation a doctor
is justified in operating on a minor, with only the minor's consent when
he is near maturity. Moreover, since this operation was not for the don-
or's benefit it was necessary to have his parent's consent. The court stated
that this was "a case of a surgical operation not for the benefit of the
person operated on but for another, and also so involved in its technique
as to require a mature mind to understand precisely what the donor was
offering to give....."29 That the donor had acted idealistically in the
hope of helping his ailing cousin was evidently regarded by the court as
irrelevant. This case might also be taken as a precedent for the propo-
sition that competent consent may be given for removal of tissue, even
if the operation is not for the donor's direct physical benefit. Albeit,
the limits to this "intangible" benefit remain undetermined and
doubtful. For instance, would the consent of a friend of the recipi-
ent, rather than a twin, who volunteers his kidney, be valid against a
post-operative repudiation on the basis of the "benefit" principle? This
question of what constitutes benefit to a donor stands in need of consid-
erable clarity.
The question of capacity of children, qua children, to consent to
transplantation is a controversial one.2 0 For example, Professor Paul A.
Freund of Harvard thinks that a child is ordinarily legally incapable of
26This reasoning has not escaped criticism. For example: "Yet the whole opinion
of the Court is based on this one opinion which leaves the door open for almost
all donors to donate since any child of normal intelligence would suffer grave and
emotional impact if his mother, father, brother, or sister died and a donation of one
his organs would have saved this relative's life. And since a child would generally be
a good donor for such a relative (because of the genetic similarity) there would seem
to be no limitation upon this doctrine." Woodside, supra note 18, at 78.
27This reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the decision in Strunk v. Strunk,
445 S.W.2d -145 (Ky. 1969), an often criticized case where the donor twin was re-
tarded.
2-126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
291d. at 123.
3OSee Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34
N.Y.U.L. R1v. 891 (1959); Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99,
107 (1967).
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
consenting to tissue removal, when the removal is of no direct benefit to
him,31 but is against an absolute disqualification which would eliminate
much useful investigation.3 2 Oxford University's Professor Daube takes
an even more stringent view, contending that children should never be
transplant donors.33 This view is in keeping with the traditional English
attitude toward hazardous experiments involving children, which are not
directly beneficial to such children. According to the English view it is
impermissible to conduct such procedures even with parental consent.34
English courts do not regard a child of less than 12 years of age as being
capable to consent to any medical procedure which may do him harm.
In Scotland it is age 14, and in America evidently 18 is the minimum
.age for a person to be capable of giving valid consent.35 According to one
source it is the practice of American doctors to refuse to perform any
operation on children under age 10, even for their direct benefit, without
parental consent. While it is the apparent consensus that any person
who is age 18 or older possesses the full capacity for requisite consent
in any recognized operation'36 in America persons under age 21 are not
usually considered as kidney donors because the validity of their con-
sent in this context is subject to question, except in identical twin
cases.3? Other groups placed in "special consent" categories, because of
their extraordinary vulnerability to undue influence, are: the feeble-
minded, the insane, soldiers, wards, medical students, and prisoners.3 8 Of
course, there is the even deeper problem of the uncomprehending or
illusory consent. Suffice it to say that the ethical and legal issues which
underlie the question of consent in such cases are of considerable com-
plexity.
Thus, the legal effect of consent by a living donor to removal of
tissues, which are not necessarily replaceable by his own body, still re-
mains relatively uncertain. Moreover, the whole question of the "extent"
of consent-what one willing individual can donate to another for pur-
poses of health or medicinal improvement-remains doubtful and in
need of full consideration by the courts. The uncertainty is further com-
3iFreund, Ethical Problems in Human Experimentation, 227 NEw ENC. J. MED.
687, 691 (1965).
32Freund, Introduction, DAEDALUS xii (Spring, 1969).
33Myers, supra note 12, at 247.
341d.
35Beecher, Scarce Resources and Medical Advancement, 98 DAEDALUS 275 (1969).
S6Myers, supra note 12, at 249.
37Stickel, supra note 20, at 44.
38For a comprehensive discussion of the subject of prisoners as donors and the
problem of consent, see Woodside, supra note 18, at 80-87; Stickel, supra note
20, at 33-34.
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plicated by the traditional social-legal attitude of hostility toward sur-
gery not carried out for the physical benefit of the patient, consent not-
withstanding.
B. Consent of the Recipient
With respect to consent by the recipient, the considerations are
somewhat different. In Anglo-American law there is a premise that
"each man is considered to be master of his own body."39 Consequently,
any physical invasion must rest on a free and informed consent. Such
consent protects the physician from a claim of assault and battery.4o By
the same token, an affirmative misrepresentation by the physician as to
the nature of the operation or a failure to disclose the probable conse-
quences of the operation expose him to a charge of unauthorized treat-
ment. The physician, however, has no obligation to describe in detail all
of the possible consequences of treatment, if the patient should have
known of the danger by the nature of the operation. The absence of in-
formed consent subjects the physician to a claim of assault and battery,
to medical malpractice for lack of conformity to medical standards'1 or
sometimes even to a claim for wrongful death.
What should be the ingredients of informed consent in heart trans-
plants? As pointed out in the excellent and thorough analysis of this
problem by Jeffrey C. Baker in Liability and the Heart Transplant,42 if
the doctor portrays the transplant as a means of probable recovery, the
consent is unlikely to be construed as an informed one. Although some
hope for prolongation of life is offered by the survival of several trans-
plant patients, the radical nature of this extreme operation requires that
the patient fully comprehend that his life will be endangered by the
transplant, and that even if he survives, his life span will probably be
limited. Few patients, if any, however, would refuse the possibility of a
prolonged life. In other words, it is a matter of semantics and verbal em-
phasis. This is where a very subtle element enters the picture and where
the greatest danger lies in this doctor-patient relationship. If consent
is couched in such terms by the doctor as to make it appear to be a
choice of "treatment" or "no treatment," it is actually no consent at all,
39Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); Schloendorff v. Society
of N.Y. Hosp. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). See also Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599
(1965).
40Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914);
Baker, Liability and the Heart Transplant, 6 Hous. L. REV. 85 (1968).
4'Baker, supra note 40, at 105.
42Baker, supra note 40, at 106.
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but a mere affirmation of the doctor's decision. 43 Moreover,. if put in
terms of "death or life," it is not a valid consent, since this is a misrep-
resentation of the true situation. The decision is not one of "death or
life," but of "probable death or probable limited prolongation of life." It
is also extremely important in this respect that the standards of such con-
sent be even more scrupulously enforced now that transplants of vital or-
gans have been apparently removed officially from the category of ex-
perimentation by the Uniform Act; thus, possibly encouraging less skill-
ful physicians to attempt the operation. The courts should be absolutely
certain that proper criteria are established for informing the patient of
the medical expectations and conceivably dire consequences of his deci-
sion, and that unscrupulous medical practitioners are held accountable
for failure to conform thereto."
LIABILITY OF TRANSPLANT PHYSICIANS
The field of heart transplantation is so new that the medical com-
munity, inter alia, is somewhat unsure of what constitutes acceptable
431n attaching significance to the principle of personal autonomy the author is
cognizant of the degree to which the power of decision of the very ill person in an
experimental setting is greatly diminished. An investigator cannot create a strong
ego for a patient or subject, but there are leads he can follow to stimulate what he
does find in the person. A sensitive investigator can enhance the consent situation for
the normal subject or patient by assisting him to perceive what it is that he does
have control over; that is, his consent. Some physicians when interviewed revealed con-
fusion about the content of patients' consent. Some indicated that they thought in-
formed consent meant that the patient is expected to agree intelligently to the design
of the experiment or to the details of a new therapy, and thus they could easily despair
of ever attaining consent or be wary of seeming to relinquish professional medical
judgment. The expectation of informed consent has never been that the patient be
a judge of the medical procedure in the consent situation. What is hoped for is the
most self-possessed decision to give consent, to say "yes" or "no" to participation.
The roots of the word consent (con-sentio) point not only to mutual understanding
between the parties but to an answer which proceeds from within the person, in-
volving feeling and perception. The most serious moral question which can be ad-
dressed to those who participate in the consent situation is this: How can the subject
be helped to employ what power of decision he does possess? Can the interaction be
turned to the mutuality of the persons involved so that fears of manipulation and
deception can transmute into meaningful cooperation between equals in the re-
search procedure? Such prominent questions are derived from the principle of per-
sons-in-mutuality, so integrally related in its development to the personalizing meaning
of agape, the central focus on Christian ethics. The two values which could come into
conflict in the consent situation, the general welfare and the welfare of the individ-
ual, must be balanced and harmonized in the consent situation itself. It is not by
accident that nonscientists have become concerned and involved in the debate about
consent. Stickel, supra note 20, at 87.
44d. See also Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trust., 154 Cal. App. 2d
560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
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procedures, techniques, and limitations.45 We have seen that the Missis-
sippi statute46 and the Uniform Act, which authorize organ and tissue
gifts after death, limit the liability of persons acting under the authority
of a written instrument of gift.4 7 But what of the physician who lacks or
exceeds such authorization? While the Uniform Act does not define the
donee's liability for failure to act in "good faith," it would seem that he
would be accountable in damages for accepting a gift with knowledge of
its revocation; for knowingly exceeding the terms of the donation; or in
a single-organ situation, for failure to return the body to the survivors
in a condition suitable for burial.4s Living donors, such as donors of
paired organs (kidney), however, are not subject to the Uniform Act,
and the law concerning them is extremely limited.. There are no reported
appellate cases on unauthorized organ removal from a living donor for
transplant purposes, or exceeding the authority when consent for such
a gift was actually made.4 9 Most problems in this area revolve around the
the question of consent. For example in Bonner v. Moran,50 a physician
was held liable in trespass for a skin graft taken from a 15-year-old boy,
despite the donor's consent.
Doubtless, a physician who removes an organ (such as a kidney)
from a living donor without proper authorization or requisite care and
skill would be liable in tort for damages as in the case of any unauthor-
ized (assault and battery) or negligently performed (malpractice) oper-
ation.
5
1
As a convenient vehicle to explore possible civil liability of the
transplant physician in cases of post-mortem organ donation, Jeffrey
Baker has suggested the following hypothetical:
45Since the conventional definition of death has been the only legally recog-
nized definition to date, the legality of unconventional determinations of death, so.
called because based on an unconventional definition of death, and also of trans-
plant surgery dependent on these determinations, is uncertain. Luyties, Suggested Re-
visions to Clarify Section 7 of the U.A.G.A. on Determinations of Death, 11 ARiz. L.
REV. 749 (1969).
46Miss. CODE ANN. § 278.3-06 (b) (Supp. 1972).
47U.A.G.A. § 7.
48U.A.G.A. § 7(a).
49Luyties, supra note 45, at 749.
50126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
5aFor an exculpatory statute which pre-existed the U.A.G.A., see TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 4590-1 (1960), repealed by Act of May 29, 1969, Tex. Laws ch. 375, § 9: "the
hospital or physician shall not be civilly or criminally liable for removing said organs
or any part thereof from the body, providing the donor has, prior to death, exe-
cuted a valid written agreement as provided herein." See also Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d
(5th Cir. 1943) (an operation performed without patient's consent is a technical
battery).
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D is injured in an automobile collision and is brought uncon-
scious to a modern hospital. A surgeon, S, examines D and con-
cludes that he has suffered a fractured skull, and that his brain
is hemorrhaging badly. S determines that there is no hope of
saving D's life and later death is pronounced. Since D's internal
organs are still intact, S immediately connects him to an arti-
ficial respirator to keep his tissues viable. Recipient, R, has
been bedridden in the hospital for some time with a deteriorat-
ing heart condition. After some tests, S decides that D is a suit-
able donor and obtains R's consent to perform the transplant.
D's wife consents and the transplant is performed. Artificial
equipment is removed from D's body and R is returned to the
recovery room.5 2
This hypothetical raises several possible legal issues: (I) When is D
legally dead so that S can remove his organs without incurring malprac-
tice liability for causing that death?58 (2) In what area may S encounter
malpractice to R, the recipient? (3) Are heart transplants malpractice
per se on the ground that they are experimental and violative of public
policy?-s
S2Baker, supra note 40, at 107.
5SThis question is often a subject of much "semantical variation," which further
complicates the basic issue. Examples: (1) "Doctors are faced with a dilemma as to
should a person be kept alive artifically or allowed to die naturally." (2) "The re-
ligious and moral question involved is whether or not a doctor should speed up a
donor's death when death is imminent .. " Opposing this point of view, Rabbi
Emanuel Jakobovits, Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth states: "Even a frac-
tion of life is precious. Therefore no one must hasten the death of a donor." (3) "At
a recent scientific meeting in London, Professor Michael Woodruff who performed
Britain's first kidney transplant operation, stated that 'doctors must remove organs
from a donor before he dies if transplant operations are to succeed.'" (Note that all
of these statements turn on the definition of the term "death.') Such definitional
variation is enough to give a philologist a verbal nightmare. Greenstone, Legal As-
pects of Organ Transplants, 92 N.J.L.J. 449, 454 (1969).
While the electroencephalograph might well be used in all cases in order to
determine cerebral death, it is of particular interest to those patients who
have had catastrophic neurologic difficulty and who require, in order to
preserve life, ventilation by mechanical means. To continue life in such pa-
tients condemned to eternal state of coma is merely a triumph of protoplasmic
resuscitation. It is doubtful whether there is any benefit to the patient, and
certainly there is a financial drain on the family.
Wasmuth, Organ Transplantation, LEGAL MEDICINE NEWS (1969). See Fletcher, The
Patient's Right to Die, 221 Harpers, Ocr., 1960, at 139; Stevens, What is Death, 94
RYADERs DIGEST 225 (May, 1969); 205 JA.M.A. 29 (1968); Collins, Limits of Respon-
sibility in Prolonging Life, 206 J.A.M.A. 391 (1968).
-See E. DAVIES, TRANSPLANT-THERAPY OR EXPERIMENT. "There should be legisla-
tion to make it clear that a transplant operation would not per se give rise to civil
or criminal liability. The surgeon would then have some protection but would still
be under a duty of care not to endanger the donor's health," (or the recipient's?).
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As to the first question, the responsibility of interpreting the physi-
ological conditions constituting death are left, under the Uniform Act,
to the discretion and judgment of the attending physician (section 7
(b)) ,s5 who, by section 7 (c) 56 is apparently absolved from responsi-
bility when acting in good faith. Section 278.3-06 of the Mississippi stat-
ute has similar provisions. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a court
might interpret these exculpatory provisions narrowly,57 in which event
the physician's determination of death might be circumscribed by vari-
ous possibilities of civil and criminal liability. 58
One authority, in concluding that Section 7 of the Uniform Act
does not necessarily afford protection to the physician, stated: "The first
step in deciding whether such a physician is somehow protected by the
U.A.G.A.'s disclaimer is to determine whether he acts 'in accord with'
section 7 (b) (directing that 'the time of death shall be determined
by a physician who tends the donor...'), when he makes a determination
of death. The second step is to determine whether a negligent act can be
committed in good faith."5 9 If both questions can be answered affirma-
tively, the determiner of death should be immune from liability, pro-
vided, of course, that the determination is alleged to be only negligent-
not intentionally wrongful.
55U.A.G.A. § 7 (b): "The time of death shall be determined by a physician who
tends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who certifies the death. The
physician shall not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a
part."
56d. § 7 (c).: "A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this
Act or with the anatomical gift laws of another state (or a foreign country) is not
liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal pro-
ceeding for his act."
s7"Not all courts can necessarily be expected to conclude that doctors are au-
thorized to make unconventional determinations of death in conjunction with UA.G.A.
-authorized body gifts even if confronted with the intention of the drafters to nega-
tive the older, anachronistic definitions of death and to leave the definition of death
to the medical profession." Luyties, supra note 45, at 761.
s5There is an apparent disagreement concerning the U.A.G.A.'s "exculpatory
clause." Some authors contend that the clause is far more extensive than it appears.
They opine that:
The possible criminal or civil responsibility of the physician who makes the
determination to discontinue medical treatment in maintaining circulation is
apparently governed by the Anatomical Act. A person acting in good faith in
accordance with the terms of the Act is not liable in damages or criminal
prosecution. Moreover, a respected legal scholar (Fletcher) has suggested that
the discontinuation of treatment is an omission, rather than an affirmative act,
which places the question in the context of what 'doctors customarily do.'
Randall & Randall, supra note 7, at 37.
59Luyties, supra note 45, at 749.
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To the extent that the attending physician determines death for the
purpose of designating when organ removal from a corpse can com-
mence, the physician is acting in accord with the Uniform Act. Conse-
quently, assuming good faith compliance with the terms of the anatomi-
cal gift, the doctor should be protected from any claims of mental dis-
tress caused by the mishandling of the dead body. However, the doctor
in the transplant setting not only determines death of a donor qua
corpse; he also determines the death qua patient. Thus, if a question
arises as to time of death, the fact that an attending doctor made the de-
termination that death had occurred before organ removal or withdraw-
al of supportive therapy would not necessarily justify application of the
disclaimer to immunize the doctor from liability for a negligent determi-
nation made when the donor was still alive.60 The disclaimer applies only
to the acts of the attending doctor in his relationship to the donor qua
corpse so that a malpractice claim based on the use of improper criteria
to determine death or misapplication of proper criteria may still be
heard.1 Indeed, the disclaimer probably does not apply to the acts of
the attending doctor with regard to the donor qua patient, but the
meaning of the disclaimer is difficult to extract from the terms of the
Uniform Act. From the discussions of the Uniform Act in the Commit-
tee of the Whole of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in August, 1967, and July, 1968, where the disclaimer
was analyzed the following conclusions (as to the intended meaning of
the disclaimer) can be drawn. First, good faith was intended to protect
roSee generally Corday, The Patient's Rights Always Come First, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NATIONAL MEDICOLEGAL SYMPOSIUM (1969) ; Halley & Harvey, Definitions of Death,
69 J. KAN. MED. Soc'v 280 (1968); Hamlin, Life and Death by EEG, J.A.M.A. 112
(1964); Sadler, Transplantation-A Case for Consent, 280 NEw ENG. J. MED. 862
(1969); Wecht 8c Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Trans-
plantation, 18 DEPAUL L.J. 588 (1969); Williams, Transplantations-Other Tissues and
Organs, 65 NURSING TIMES 818 (1969); Williams, Transplantation Problems, 65 NuRs-
ING TIMES 849 (1969). See also Hearings on S.B. 2999 Before the Senate Committee on
the District of Columbia, 91st Congress, 2d Sess. 1730 (1970).
6GThis is the crux of the problem:
On the other hand, courts which have paid lip service in the past to the
idea that the time of death is a question of medical judgment have apparent-
ly meant only that the time at which all vital functions ceased (the tra-
ditional legal definition) was a question of fact. That is, the question of the
existence of death was resolved within the context of traditional legal criteria,
. . . Therefore, in a pre-U.A.G.A. claim arising out of a doctor's with-
drawal of supportive therapy or a surgeon's removal of an organ before con-
ventional death, a court could have instructed a jury to determine, in terms
of the existing definition of death, whether the signs which were observed
by the doctor constituted conventional death. The question is then the im-
port of the first sentence of section 7 (b).
Luyties, supra note 45, at 755. In other words, does this give the determining physician
the freedom to use any criteria that the medical profession will accept?
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the donee or any doctor who accepted and used an anatomical gift, os-
tensibly made in accord with the Uniform Act without actual notice of
a latent procedural defect in the gift document. Second, protection is
also afforded to the donee who accepts an anatomical gift from a sur-
vivor of the decedent without knowledge that the survivor knows of the
objections to the gift by other survivors or by the decedent. Third, if
the gift is accepted after it has been revoked but before actual notice
of the revocation is received, the recipient and others acting on the
gift are immune from liability.
Another factor which militates against construing the disclaimer to
immunize negligent determination of death from liability is that it would
probably be held unconstitutional. Since many states have constitutional
provisions which prohibit the abrogation or limitation of actions for
damages, an interpretation of the Uniform Act's disclaimer which would
limit the common law right to sue for injuries caused by malpractice
would be presumptively unconstitutional. 6 2
Since the Uniform Act might be construed to mean that doctors
are authorized, if acting in "good faith," to extract organs from bodies
without fear of liability and are also authorized to use their own judg-
ment in determining the point at which transplantation can be com-
menced without judicial "second-guessing," there arises the obvious
danger that the disclaimer (section 7 (c)), might be interpreted to im-
munize all death determiners from liability so long-as they acted in
"good faith," rather than only those who acted non-negligently.63
A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of
this Act or with the anatomical gift laws of another state or a
foreign country is not liable for damages in any civil action or
subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act;
provided that nothing contained in this or any other clause
of this Act shall be construed to exculpate the negligence of
any physician, surgeon, or other medical attendant in render-
ing or discontinuing medical treatment to a patient.4
62See 2 LOUtSELL & WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACncE § 21.36 at 594.27-.29 (1969).
See also Moseley v. Lily Ice Cream Co., 38 Ariz. 417, 420, 300 P. 958, 959(1931).
63"Good faith is 'without culpable negligence,' or a wilful disregard for the
rights of others." Whitney v. Huntington, 37 Minn. 197, 201, 33 N.W. 561, 563 (1897).
"Bad faith is stronger than the idea of negligence." Warfield Natural Gas v. Allen,
248 Ky. 646, 655, 59 S.W.2d 534, 538 (1933).
64Luyties, supra note 45, at 768 (emphasis in original). Physicians in some states,
such as Arkansas, have anticipated this problem and have initiated legislation to in-
sulate them, to some extent, from malpractice liability in such cases. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 82-410.1 et seq. (1960). Other states have taken the opposite position
and have modified the disclaimer provision of the model UA.G.A. See, e.g., Mo. ANN.
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If the surgeon employed the traditional criteria of heartbeat and
respiration, in our hypothetical, D would presumably be regarded as
legally dead6 5 prior to the organ transfer, thus obviating any difficul-
ty.86 If, however, the determining physicians used the cerebral-death test
for the moment of death, there would be room for conflicting expert
testimony,67 especially in view of the almost universal acceptance of the
heart-lung basis for death .6 In this situation it might be possible to prove
to a jury that under the circumstances of the case the certifying physician
acted improperly. Furthermore, because of the absence of standardiza-
tion in the time period for recording the "flat EEG" before such a de-
termination, there is a possibility of a conflict even among the physicians
present at the scene.. The jury, and later an appellate court, therefore
might find, on the basis of the testimony of experts and eye-witnesses,
STAT. § 194-270 (3) (Supp. 1970) (added "without negligence," "to good faith."); MONT.
RV. CODES ANN. § 69-2321 (1969) (eliminated "disclaimer'); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
220.7 (c) (1965) (replaced provision with "due care"); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 97.290 (3)
(1969) (replaced "good faith" with "probable cause').
65Simultaneous death disputes are the closest to a legal determination of the exact
moment of death that the courts have decided. However, while adopting the conven-
tional heart-lung criteria most do nothing but rule that one decedent predeceased
another. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958); Schmitt v.
Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961), motion lor rehearing denied, 379 S.W.2d 548 (Mo.
1964). In the Smith case, the Arkansas Supreme Court held the deaths were not
simultaneous, since "Mrs. Smith was [not] dead, scientifically or otherwise, unless
the conditions set out in the definition existed." 317 S.W.2d at 279.
66Cf. Thomas v. Anderson, 56 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950) ("[d]eath
is not a continuing event and is an event that takes place at a precise time," i.e.,
when the "heart stops and respiration ends.") Id. at 482. "Actually, the use of the
conventional criteria affords the unscrupulous an opportunity to manipulate the de-
termination of the time of death for inheritance purposes. If the decision is influ-
enced by the wishes of certain relatives hoping to inherit, he may, by unrealistically
prolonging resuscitative measures determine the disposition of the decedent's prop-
erty." M. HouTs, DE.AT § 1.02 (3) (1967).
CrAn example of such conflict is found in Peart, Letter to the Editor, The Times
(London), June 3, 1969, at 9, col. 2: "Criteria of death in . . . patients are almost
impossible to lay down but the doctor determines this once he turns off the res-
pirator."
6sIn the past, courts have held consistently that any evidence indicating contin-
uance of the vital functions in one person beyond the time when there ceased to be
any indication of vital functions in another to be sufficient to establish survivorship.
See Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958); Thomas v. Anderson, 96
Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950). See also Sauers v. Staltz, 121 Colo. 456, 218
P.2d 741 (1950); Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952); Vaegemast v. Hess, 203
Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961); Finch
v. Edwards, 239 Mo. App. 788, 198 S.W.2d 665 (1947); Sauger v. Butler, 45 Tex. App.
527, 101 S.W. 459 (1907).
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that the doctors involved were guilty of a tort (wrongful death) for
having removed a vital organ from a living person.6
9
The requirements of the Uniform Act (section 7 (b) and the Mis-
sissippi statute [section 278.3-06 (a) ] should, of course, go far toward
eliminating the recipient surgeon's liability in this respect.7 0 Never-
theless, the transplant surgeon seems to be in the center of all of these
controversies, and "whether his involvement in all of the facets of the
transplant procedure is real or imagined, he is nonetheless pictured in
the minds of the public (and thus a jury), as being in control of every
detail."7 '
Irrespectively, there may still be conceivable grounds for malprac-
tice if, after the decedent's condition is pronounced hopeless, substan-
tial supportive therapy is not employed. It has therefore been suggested
by some commentators that transplant physicians face potential liability
for failure to continue extraordinary efforts to prolong the life of the
patient (e.g., stopping cardiac resuscitation, turning off the respirator,
removing the needle in intravenous therapy). It has also been suggested
that a physician who withdraws such life-supportive measures or who
removes a critical organ before conventional death is reached is commit-
ting an act of homicide.7 2 Since malpractice doctrines require the doctor
to provide a level of care not substantially less than that generally avail-
able, 73 the withholding of such treatment may be difficult to justify,
especially in a sophisticated clinical environment. Thus, if the defendant
physician cannot show that there was "legal" death before all hope was
pronounced lost, he must show that all hope was lost because of the
extent of the injuries. Of course the injuries might be so extensive as to
6gLuyties, supra note 45, at 760.
7OSee MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1968).
7lBaker, supra note 40, at 112. Luyties notes that:
The effectiveness of this provision will depend on interpretation of the term
"participate" in relation to the terms "removing" and "transplantation." "Par-
ticipate" could encompass everything from physically removing an organ, to
performing an autopsy to determine acceptibility of the desired organs for
transplantation, to transporting a body to a transplant center, to testing the
donor for tissue compatibility, to preserving the body's metabolic functions
to maintain oxygenation of the organs, to being merely a nonparticipating
member of a transplant team. Of these different possible things only the last
one seems certain to fall outside the scope of participation.
Luyties, supra 45, at 756 n.21.
7 2 LouISELL, TRANSPLANTATION: ExISTING LEGAL CONSTRAINT, C.J.B.A. FOUNDATION
SYMPosIUM, ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRANSPLANTA-
TION 7898 (Wolstenholm & O'Connor eds. 1966).
73See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549
(1959); Sherman, The Standard of Care in Malpractice Cases, 4 OScOODE HALL L.J.
222 (1966).
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establish that common medical practice would consider the decedent's
condition absolutely hopeless. Thus, the more extensive the injuries,
the more difficult it would become to prove that the physician was guilty
of any omission.7 4 Nevertheless, with the usual injuries of a fractured
skull and some brain damage, medical testimony may be in conflict as
to the extent and duration of treatment that should be attempted.75
Moreover, public opinion is not favorable to physicians when they
are defendants in transplant-malpractice actions. The transplant surgeon
is prepared to resort to drastic and extreme measures to save one man's
life, yet he or his representatives might do comparatively little to restore
the donor.76 The defense of the physician's judgment in such a situation
(provided the "good faith" disclaimer does not exculpate the negligent
death determiner) weakens further in light of some rather remarkable
recent reports of recoveries where otherwise certain death might be the
normal prognosis. 77
74The court in Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86 (1872), states that "[d]eath is the
opposite of life, and death cannot be caused where there is no life." Id. at 90. See Som-
mer, Additional Thoughts on the Legal Problems of Heart Transplants, 41 N.Y. ST.
BAR. J. 196 (1969).
75"A report of the Royal Academy of Medicine in London revealed that among
a group of 102 head injury victims who were still unconscious more than one month
after their injury, 63 survived and 48 of them returned to their old jobs or less de-
manding but still productive work." Sommer, supra note 74, at 198. Henry K. Beecher
". .. testified at the New York State Commission on Transplant of Vital Organs
that in tests on 1665 patients at Massachusetts General Hospital who satisfied the
Committee's Definition of brain death, 1662 that fell into that category did not re-
cover. The three others were victims of barbituate poisoning and never had been con-
sidered as donor candidates." Id. at 198 n.8. Baker has stated that, "[t]hus difficulty
of refutation may not prevent the law from finding that the withholding of all therapy
from a potential donor in clinical circumstances is malpractice, no matter how careful
'S' [see hypothetical supra at 877] was in his actual pronouncement of death. The ques-
tion of the extent of the efforts that should be required to save the donor remains."
Baker, supra note 40, at 97.
76"[S]ubstantial measures should be taken to save the donor-measures that are
consistent as possible with those that would be made to save him if he were not
a donor." Baker, supra note 40, at 100. This may perhaps be the greatest source of
potential litigation until the public and the courts accept the concept of irreversi-
ble coma as the standard criterion for death. Id. "They owe a high duty to their
potential donor-the duty to save his life if possible. They at the same time owe
that duty to the possible recipient. Add the fact that the closer to the moment of
death of the donor that his heart is removed, the greater the probability of success
of the transplant, and the extreme difficulty of the decision is manifest. The rapid
decline of life signs in the recipient could affect the decision that all hope is lost for
the donor." Id. at 97.
77See Baker, supra note 40, at 96.
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A theory supporting liability of the donor's physician has been sug-
gested by Professor Luis Kutner. 8 The physician, he says, may be sub-
jected to a "contractual liability," on the rationale that he owes a duty
to his patient to make a proper determination as to when to terminate
the relationship.7 9 A breach of this duty arises when the doctor dis-
charges the patient prematurely or discontinues treatment without giving
him an opportunity to obtain other care. Even if the doctor does not for-
mally remove himself from the case, an abandonment may still occur.
The decision of the doctor to disconnect the supporting mechanism
could be considered such an abandonment. 80 The court, however, could
imply such a duty to continue "extraordinary treatment" only when
the patient or his relatives employed the doctor in reliance upon such
treatment being provided81 If the doctor acts to make the patient's heart
available for transplantation, a breach of fiduciary duty may arise since
the doctor's primary duty is to protect and treat the patient.
Hospitals may also be held liable under a theory of deprivation of
civil rights.s2 With respect to hospitals administered by governments,
and with the ever-increasing government involvement in private hospital
operations,5 3 the estate of the patient may claim denial of civil rights in
deprivation of the right to life as a result of the denial of supporting ma-
chinery and excision of the organ.84 A denial of equal protection might
also be claimed on the ground that the patient was not accorded the
same care provided others similarly situated. Moreover, if the hospital
7SKutner, Due Process of Human Transplants: A Proposal, 24 U. MIAMI L. Rv.
782, 798 (1970).
79ld.
8oSee M. HouTs, DEATH § 1.05 (1967).
SlOne commentator has recommended that a legal decision be "forced" in these
continued resuscitation cases by institution of an action by the next of kin for an
injunction for or against the termination of therapy. He suggests, however, that a
court is not equipped to make such a medical judgment necessitated by day-to-day
changes in the patient's condition. Wasmuth, The Concepts of Death, 50 OHto
ST. L.J. 32, 51 (1969). See also M. HouTs, DEATH § 1.06 (1967).
8 2 1n November, 1971, a two million dollar damage suit was filed under the Fed-
eral Civil Rights Act against the Medical College of Virginia, charging the hospital
with allowing a black laborer to die so that his heart could be used in a transplant
operation. It was contended that Bruce 0. Tucker, the black laborer, was not granted
the same privilege and immunities afforded a white person. William Tucker, the
donor's brother, had previously filed a one million dollar suit, which is still pending,
against the hospital for removing the heart without the consent of relatives. Also
named as defendants were the state medical examiner and 11 college physicians. Ark-
ansas Gazette, Nov. 5, 1971.
s
3See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
s4See Kutner, supra note 78, at 798.
(VOL. 44
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
lacks procedural safeguards for making such determinations this might
also be treated as a denial of civil rights.
In Sweden, the question of the doctor's obligation to continue sup-
portive therapy arose in 1965.85 When an elderly patient had a cerebral
hemorrhage, to spare her further agony, the doctor discontinued intra-
venous nourishment, which resulted in death 7 days later., At a discipli-
nary hearing before the Royal Medical Board, the council (two doctors,
two lawyers, and a member of Parliament) was unable to decide wheth-
er the doctor had committed a crime or an act of professional neglect.
The case was referred to the local prosecutor, who, after consulting the
attorney general, accused the doctor of professional neglect: (1) in
having shortened the woman's life by the discontinuance of therapy, and
(2) in having asked permission of the patient's relatives to do so. Regard-
ing the first charge, the court found no guilt, holding that the continua-
tion of therapy "would not have fulfilled a medical or human purpose."
As to the second charge, the court likewise thought there was no intent
to share the responsibility for the decision with the relatives.6 This case
is arguably a precedent for the proposition that such futile, meaning-
less therapy is equally unnecessary in transplant cases.
It would seem appropriate to mention some of the observations rele-
vant to this matter contained in a very well-considered analysis by Pro-
fessor George Fletcher.s 7 Fletcher begins with a familiar hypothetical
involving a comatose patient with a flat electroencephalogram. Accord-
ing to the physician's best judgment the patient has only an infinitesimal
chance of recovery; nevertheless, he possibly can be sustained (as a "vege-
table") by intravenous therapy. Professor Fletcher then poses the dilem-
matic question: From a legal standpoint, what should the physician do?
It would be a mistake, he says, to think that legal tradition contains a
clear answer. As a first step toward the solution, he points to the legal
significance between acts and omissions in this context. A doctor may be
civilly and criminally liable either for intentionally taking life, or for
omitting to act, s and thus permitting death to occur naturally. If the
question involves an act, the relationship between the doctor and patient
is irrelevant. If it is an omission, however, that relationship is control-
85See Doctor Cleared in Euthanasia Case, MEDICAL WoRLD NEWS 49 (Apr. 2,
1965).
81d.
87203 J.A.MA. 65, 68 (1968). See also Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WAsh. L.
Rav. 999 (1967).
SsDoctors generally explain their freedom from culpability on the ground that
the termination of treatment is always an omission. A simpler principle would be
that a homicide resulting from the termination is justified whenever the withhold-
ing of treatment would have been justified. Kutner, supra note 78, at 796.
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ling. Applying this distinction, if the ceasing of the activity to artificially
prolong life is an "act," the law unequivocably forbids it. If it is an omis-
sion, the analysis is more flexible.. Whether it is forbidden as an omission
would depend on the demands imposed by the relationship between doc-
tor and patient. The doctor's duty to prolong life, Fletcher states, is a
function of his relationship with his patient; and, in the typical case,
that relationship devolves into the patient's expectations of the treat-
ment he will receive. These expectations are, in turn, a function of the
practices prevailing in the community at the time. The practices in the
use of the respirator are what doctors actually do in a particular time
and place. Thus, it is the customary medical standards which determine
the expectations of patients and regulate the relationship, and ultimate-
ly, the law. In regulating this relationship, physicians control the extent
of their own legal obligations. This conclusion generally appears to be
the same as that tacitly adopted by the authors of the Uniform Act,
where the determination of death is left to the sound judgment and dis-
cretion of the attending physician, s9 who will inferentially be responsi-
ble for a justification of his decision under standards fashioned and fol-
lowed by his peers.
Finding Professor Fletcher's reasoning persuasive, I would think it
highly desirable, if not essential, for a single standard of death to be
adopted.O The most desirable is brain death manifested by "irreversible
coma." This suggestion, of course, is not meant to advocate that the de-
cision be made in every case on the basis of absence of central nervous
system functions' alone. It is simply the recognition of brain function as
s
5Sommer, supra note 74, at 201. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1968, at 34, col. 2,
where, in discussing a resolution passed by the American Medical Association's House
of Delegates at its 22nd Clinical Convention in 1968, it is stated: "the cause of
death . . . must be evident and of an irreversible type. The fact of death must be
demonstrated by adequate consent and acceptable scientific evidence in the operation
of the physicians making the determination."
9OWhether there should be a statutory definition of death which would elimi-
nate confusion between the legal and medical definitions, is currently being
considered by the New York State Temporary Commission on Transplant of
Vital Organs. This nine-man commission is under the chairmanship of Justice
Erwin Shapiro of the New York Supreme Court. . . . Dr. Adrian Kantrowitz,
the doctor of surgery at Maimonides Medical Center in Brooklyn, testified
before the New York Commission that he was against any attempt to statu-
torily define death. He said that he hoped lawyers would not become too
deeply involved in the issues because they are liable to "mess things up."
Sommer, supra note 74, at 200-01. One state, Kansas, has adopted a statutory definition
of death. See J. Leavell, A Treatise on the Law and Ethics of Transplants 251, n. 833,
1972 (unpublished dissertation in Yale Law School Library).
OiSome thoughtful criticism which gives pause for reflection:
This new definition of heart donor eligibility that substitutes "irreversible
brain damage" for "total death" raises more questions than it answers. Does
acceptance of this concept mean that is it no longer necessary to treat, for
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the crucial factor in such determinations and "that any pronouncement
of death is a statement of the impossibility of continued brain function
with return of consciousness and interaction of the patient with his en-
vironment irrespective of whether the determination is based on the clin-
ical observations of cessation of heartbeat and respiration, or on facts
obtained by more modern and sophisticated methods such as the EEG."92
When physicians employ the heart-lung standard and its concom-
itant of insisting that physicians continue to support circulation and
respiration as long as possible, irrespective of any hope of brain function
restoration, we might perforce prevent the utilization of medically in-
dispensable resource material to patients with good chances of survival.
However, to insist on such a standard means, we either close our eyes to
what doctors in fact do at the present time, or require that physicians
apply the practices of a generation ago rather than keep up with
advancements that have been made.93
Marshall Houts has developed a standard for testing the physician's
determination of death, as well as providing guidelines which recognize
that a physician has a professional responsibility to his patient "which
he can fulfill only by an exercise of conscientious and enlightened
medical judgment, and that this judgment may vary as the circum-
stances under which it is exercised vary." Hout's definition of death is:
example, the senile patient who would meet such criteria? How do eligible
donors differ in principle from totally feeble-minded individuals? What are
the implications for the inheritance of property if the heart of an intestate
donor is kept beating with a pacemaker while the search for a recipient goes
on and the donor's wife dies during the interval? Does this new definition of
death for the heart donor open up new channels of criminal activity that will
lead to the burking of patients to increase the supply of eligible donors?
Let us examine the nature of this revolutionary change in our ethics and
pursue its implications to their logical conclusion. Substituting irreversible
brain damage for complete absence of any living manifestations in any organ
as essential in the diagnosis of death forces us to examine the meaning of the
phrase "irreversible brain damage." The presently recommended definition of
irreversible brain damage demands a complete absence of any manifestations
of brain function, all the way from the higher levels of cortical activity down
through the centers governing the emotions, sensations, automatic functions,
and muscular control and including the spinal reflexes, with, however, two
special exceptions -the centers controlling respiration and circulation. These
centers are excluded for practical and not for ethical reasons. In severely ill
patients, the function of these centers can be taken over by machines that may
be stopped until the diagnosis of death is made on other counts. Moreover, for
successful heart transplantation, the heart must be alive if it is to benefit the
recipient.
Rutstein, The Ethical Design of Human Experiments, DAmEAI.s 536 (Spring, 1969).
92M. HouTs & J. HUNT, 1 DEATH § 1.03, at 1-25 (1970).
93M. § 1.02 (3), at 1-23. See also Sommer supra note 74, at 196; Wheeler, Anatomi-
cal Gifts in illinois, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 471 (1969); Comment, Medico-Legal Problems
With the Question of Death, 45 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 202 (1968-69).
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Death of a human being is that point in time at which
there has occurred an irreversible cessation of such of the vital
functions as renders impossible a return of even a minimal
degree of consciousness and interaction between the individual
and his environment. 94
He offers the following tests for determining the point of death:
(1) An isoelectric encephalographic tracing.
(2) Cessation of respiration if not supported by artificial means.
(3) Cessation of circulation if not supported by artificial means.
(4) Bilateral mydriasis (dilatation) and fixation of pupils; no
reaction to light.
(5) Failure to respond to even the most painful stimuli.
(6) Absence of all voluntary movement, and of spontaneous
spasms or muscle movements.
(7) Absence of reflexes.
(8) Ophthalmoscopic evidence of cessation of circulation.
(9) Angiographic evidence of cessation of cerebral circulation.
(10) Falling blood pressure when vasopressor drugs and arti-
ficial support are withdrawn.
(11) Failure to react to atropine.
(12) Continuation of observed criteria for such period of time
as will permit formulation of an opinion, with reasonable
medical certainty, that cerebral function has ceased irre-
versibly and that return of even minimal consciousness and
interaction with the environment cannot be expected. 95
Among the advantages of this joint-definition test are that it
separates the definition of death from the statement of the criteria
by which the fact and time of death may be determined, thus pre-
venting any of these criteria from hardening into immutable prin-
ciples of law96 either as absolute indications that death has occurred
or as essentials to such a determination. It recognizes that brain function
is the crucial factor in the determination of life and death, and that any
pronouncement of death is a statement of the impossibility of return of
brain function. This is true whether based on the classical clinical
94M. Hours & J. HUNT, I DEATH § 1.03 (1970).
95Id.
96"If science could provide some clear, unequivocal facts about death then perhaps
the law could change its mind. Such facts can be established, however, only on the
basis of a comparison definition of life. It is merely survival. And as more is learned
about such things as the role of DNA will we discover a need to discriminate between
different kinds of human life?" 1971 BRITANNICA YEARBOOK OF SCIENCE AND THE FUTUaE
83; see Biorck, When is Death, 1968 Wis. L. Rzv. 484; Corday, Life-Death in Human
Transplantation, 55 A.B.A.J. 629 (1969).
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observation of heartbeat, respiration, reflexes, and response to stimuli,
or upon facts determined by more modern and sophisticated methods
such as electroencephalography and electrocardiography. In this respect
it acknowledges that deaths may have occurred even though heartbeat
and respiration may continue with the aid of artificial support, 97 and
conversely, that although spontaneous respiration and heartbeat have
ceased, life may still be present. It places primary responsibility for the
decision upon the physician rather than surrounding him with rigid
criteria which he must apply in every case. This joint-definition test
avoids a dual standard by which a person may be considered dead for
one purpose but alive for another. Also, it recognizes that death may
occur under circumstances which, from the standpoint of evidence
available for its medical determination or proof in litigation, are less
ideal, and would permit a determination on the evidence available
without necessity for carving out exceptions from a more rigidly formu-
lated definition and criteria. Another advantage is that it would permit,
without reformulation of concepts, the recognition by the courts of
advances in science and technology and their consequent changes in
medical thought and practice.9 s
It is of course conceivable that the surgeon could be held account-
able in damages for making the decision to perform the transplant on a
particular recipient because of lack of acceptable standards as to when
a transplant is really necessary. This would be the case if the plaintiff
could establish that the physician did not use proper judgment in his
decision and that the transplant may have shortened the recipient's
life (even if he survived for a period of time).99 Prior to the operation
the physician must first decide whether or not the transplant, a severely
drastic and novel surgical procedure, is the patient's only hope for
prolongation of life or for a preferred period of improved life. The
physician's judgment may well be the decisive factor in the decision.
The burden of proving that the recipient would have lived longer
without the operation would be perhaps insurmountable, especially
without supportive testimony from other physicians associated with the
recipient. The physician's judgment, made in the light of his medical
knowledge and training, is unique among cases because of varying
97"The French, by providing a legal definition of death, have put the protection
and the prestige of the law behind transplant surgeons removing organs while arti-
ficial maintenance continues the respiration and circulation of the donor." Myers,
supra note 12, at 255.
9sM. HouTs & J. HUNT, supra note 92, § 1.05 at 1-4, Robertson & Jacob, The Sig-
nificance and Future of Organ Banking, 74 CASE & COM., 21 (1969).
99Baker, supra note 40, at 103.
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degrees of disease and different characteristics of patients. Thus, his
judgment may be virtually impossible to refute. Presumably, there would
be present a progressive deterioration in the patient's blood pressure and
respiration, and an overall decline in the heart's ability to sustain life. 1'0
Also, the following factors would likely be considered significant: (1) A
patient in a condition that warrants a transplant may have difficulty
surviving the operation. (2) The transplantation is not a permanently
corrective treatment at the present time. Thus, if the recipient had
shown any signs of improvement from the time he was designated a
potential recipient until the actual transplant, this could be a significant
factor in the malpractice claim, and could be established by competent
evidence.
For these reasons it would appear advisable that the transplant
surgeon lessen the chances for liability by referring this "necessity de-
cision" to an independent committee.101 This would also have the de-
sirable social utility of insuring adequate supervision and responsibility
for all such operations. Moreover, and equally as important, legally
valid efforts to prolong and add quality to life would be relieved of
the retarding effects such litigation might create. The Uniform Act will
probably be construed as giving the legal imprimatur to transplant op-
erations, thus, removing all such procedures, including cardiac, from
the anathematized category of "purely experimental," and thus possibly
subjecting physicians to "strict liability" for performing operations
which are ultra-hazardous in nature.1 02 Therefore, the operations would
'old.
'OlCompare "The Committee of National Health and Medical Research Council
of Australia drew up an elaborate proposal for the conduct of organ transplant
operations. One interesting feature of the proposal was the requirement that two
medical teams be involved - one for deciding when further medical treatment of the
donor has become useless, and a second for carrying out the operation." 1970 ENCYCLO-
PEDiA BRrrANNICA YEARBOOK 461 (1970). Interesting, Dr. Denton Cooley has declared
that if legal problems continue to grow involving transplants the resultant pressure
may force surgeons to entirely abandon this procedure. MED. WORLD NEWS, Aug. 9,
1968, at 22.
'O2The leading cases supporting a physician's malpractice liability for injuries re-
sulting from untried treatment (experimentation) are Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb.
488 (App. Div. 1871), reversed on other grounds, 50 N.Y. 696 (1872). In this case
the defendant attempted treatment of a broken leg by placing the patient's injured
limb in a "heavy steel thing that had teeth." The court declared that a patient comes
to a doctor expecting his treatment to conform to established professional standards.
Hence, the use of unconventional forms of treatment is at the practitioner's peril,
absent an informed consent. See also Graham v. Doctor Pratt Institute, 163 Ill. App. 91
(1911); Hailes v. Raines, 162 Mo. App. 46, 141 S.W. 917 (1911) ; W. PRossER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 508 (3d ed. 1964).
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be "inside the law," as it were. 03 The legality of the operation itself,
involving any organ, appears to be no longer questionable in those
jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Act. Any liability would
be contingent on some factor other than the nature of the operation
itself, such as failure to obtain a legally valid consent. 04 Patients are
presumed to consent to their physician's use of ordinary and accepted
techniques. If the physician wishes to use a technique or method other
than that generally accepted as therapy, he has a duty to obtain the
patient's consent thereto. Failure to do so or subsequent failure to ob-
serve a reasonable standard of care subjects him to liability.' 0 5 In ab-
sence of negligent execution of the novel procedure, however, there is
no recourse to a malpractice action when consent has been obtained. 0
It is well settled that a physician who acts negligently in treatment
of a patient will subject himself to liability.101 There is also the
possibility of a malpractice action for failure to make a reasonably
proper match between the donor organ and the recipient. For example,
it would be obvious, even to a layman, that it would be indefensible to
transplant a heart from an elderly person into an adolescent. 08 The
same would appear true where there is unusual disparity in size between
the two organs. The placing of a smaller organ in a larger cavity ap-
parently diminishes the chance of success, since a smaller heart should
not be able to circulate a system which previously required a much
larger one. Dr. Denton Cooley evidently makes a practice of matching
body weights to presumably match the work potential of both hearts.109
l&3See also Segal, Medical Malpractice in an Organ Transplant Case, 15 PRAC. LAW.
65-66 (1968), wherein it is said: "[i]t is not medically conceded that heart transplants
have gone past the investigational stage of medical progress."
104NWhenever the proposed medical procedure, diagnostic test, or course of
therapy constitutes a departure from what is considered merely routine pro-
cedure (e.g., taking patient's pulse, checking heartbeat, testing reflexes, etc.)
and involves an added element of risk to the patient's welfare, the courts have
imposed the requirement that the physician first obtain the patient's informed
consent. Failure to do so will subject the physician to liability.
U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., LEGAL ASPECTS OF PUIBLIC HEALTH SERVICE MEDICINE 36 (1970).
'O'See Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 NAV. 762 (1935); Comment, Medical
Experiments: Insurance, 70 COLUM. L, REv. 965 (1970).
106Baker, supra note 40, at 96.
167"A physician is bound to bestow such reasonable ordinary care, skill and dili-
gence as physicians and surgeons in good standing in the same neighborhood in the
same general line of practice, ordinarily have and exercise in like cases." Copeland v.
Robertson, 236 Miss. 95, 110, 112 So. 2d 236, 241 (1959); Everad v. Hopkins, 80 Eng.
Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1650).
l0sBaker, supra note 40, at 105.
"6Cooley, Minutes of the Cape Town Meeting, MED. WORLD NEws, Aug. 9, 1968,
at 22.
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It is certainly arguable that a half-sized heart seems obviously insufficient
and that the transplant means almost certain death for a patient who
otherwise might have been supported by artificial means pending ar-
rival of a more suitable donor. 110 In time, after more research, the
degree of similarity will evidently be established, providing a legal test
setting the limits of permissible discrepancy as to the donor.
Undeniably neither the Uniform Act nor the Mississippi statute
insulates a transplant surgeon from ordinary malpractice liability. Thus,
if he "bungles the job" or fails to demonstrate requisite skill he will not
be shielded by the Uniform Act."' The usual standard, of course, is
whether in his performance he has possessed and exercised the degree
of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by mem-
bers of the medical profession in the community. Since the transplant
operation cannot, at this stage of development, be regarded as a "regular
medical practice," how are the components of this standard of care
(skill) applicable to transplant medical personnel to be ascertained?
The following questions are pertinent to the formulation of such
standards: 1 2 (1) Since malpractice doctrines require that the doctor
provide a level of care not insubstantially less than that generally avail-
"OBaker, supra note 40, at 105.
11The following general conclusions were drawn by Attorney Melvin B. Bishop
from a large number of malpractice cases:
(1) One licensed to practice medicine is presumed to possess that degree of
skill and learning of the average member of his profession in the same local-
ity. (2) Before a physician or surgeon can be held liable, he must have done
something in the treatment of his patient which the recognized standard of
good medical practice in the community forbids in such cases, or he must
have neglected to do something which standard requires. (3) To sustain a
verdict of malpractice, the standard of local practice must be shown by af-
firmative evidence. Unless there is evidence the jury may not speculate as to
what required standard is, or whether he has departed from it. (4) Negli-
gence is never presumed but must be affirmatively proved and no presumption
arises from the mere fact that the treatment has been unsuccessful, failing
to bring the best results, or that the patient has died. (5) Negligence by
reason of departure from proper standards must be established by expert
testimony, unless the negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would
have no difficulty in recognizing it. (6) The testimony of the physicians that
they would have followed a different course of treatment is not sufficient to
establish malpractice unless it also appears that the treatment deviated from
one of the standard methods ...
Bishop, Medical Malpractice, 36 Miss. L.J. 287, 288 (1965). No system which embraces
fundamental professional relationships eventually involving ethical risks of individuals
can remove personal liability.
112"It is impossible to state in general terms what constitutes reasonable standards
of medical care and practice . . . this question can be as complex as the question of
what constitutes informed consent, and the answer to it varies with the individual cir-
cumstances of the case in which it arises." Dunphy, The Story of Organ Transplanta-
tion, 21 HAsT. L.J. 67, 70 (1970); PFxzER LABORATORIES SPECrRuM 20 (1966).
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able, does the standard practice in the particular locale of the suit, where
possibly few, if any, similar operations have beer performed, have to
conform with the practice in the larger national community? (2)
Should the standard be based on the transplantation of the same organ,
or on transplantation generally? (3) What bearing will the accumulated
experience of all of the transplant surgeons with a particular organ
have on this formulation?"83
The codes, rules, and standards recently established by the medical
community itself will doubtlessly be considered. Because of the investiga-
tive aspects of transplantation the practice would be subject to these
ethical guidelines, Although these rules are not law in the technical
sense, they have some of the attributes of law,114 since they are generally
acknowledged within the group as general norms and thus recognized
by the courts as indicia of acceptable conduct.
In the absence of any illuminating decisions dealing specifically
with transplantations it would appear that doctors engaged in such
procedures would be subject to the existing body of malpractice law,
as well as a potential conflict-of-interest problem.
CRIMINAL LAW AND TRANSPLANTS
When an organ donor's life is artificially sustained and a vital-organ
transplant attempted, the legal rights of the donor are uncertain and
the criminal liability of the physicians involved remains unclear. This
uncertainty results from the disparity between the legal and medical
definitions of death.
While heart removal in the days of the rack and screw was not re-
garded as a particularly efficient means of killing, being too "messy,"
it was nevertheless considered effective and receives more than passing
mention in the literature of torture and inquisition (and even "religion,"
e.g., Aztecs).115 Of course, today's transplant physician is acting to cure
and not to kill in replacing the diseased vital organ. Yet, in a time
when the number of transplants are relatively few and the rate of
113PFIZER LABORATORIES SPECTRUM, supra note 112.
1141d.; Stickel, supra note 20, at 52. These codes and rules are: (1) The Nurem-
berg Articles (1946) ; (2) American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics
(1946); (3) National Institute of Health Guiding Principles in Medical Research In-
volving Humans (1953) ; (4) World Medical Association's Code of Ethics-Declaration
of Helsinki (1964); (5) United States Public Health Service Policy and Procedure
Order No. 129 (1966); (6) American Medical Association's House of Delegates, Ethical
Guidelines for Clinical Investigation; and (7) American Medical Association's Heart
Transplant Guidelines.
"1SSee generally A. VERMuLL, Tx INQuisrrioN (1931).
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success low, it can be argued that the transplant surgeon runs an appreci-
able risk of prosecution for criminal conduct. While the risks of civil
liability have apparently been obviated to some extent by adoption o f
the Uniform Act, and by execution of release forms, the risks of criminal
proceedings would still seem to be present, partly because of the vague-
ness of the term "good faith" in the Act.116
Generally, under the criminal law it is incumbent on a person to
act only in limited circumstances, depending upon his relationship
with another, being free to omit all but the most basic and ordinary
acts expected. Thus, when a doctor fails to provide certain treatment,
he has merely made a value judgment dictated by his training and experi-
ence. The mens rea (guilty intent) is lacking, which perhaps explains
why there is no known case where a doctor has been successfully prose-
cuted for omitting treatment. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a
doctor might be found to have committed a crime in disconnecting a
mechanical supportive device in order to facilitate a transplant. He might
be found to have acted wilfully, knowing that the patient would "die"
(using the conventional criteria) .Of course, if he could establish that
he did not alter the normal course of events by turning off the machine
(i.e., the condition was irreversible and death was thus inexorable and
imminent) the act might be found to have been justifiable. Thus, under
these circumstances the withholding of treatment might be found
legally permissible.
It is apparent that using the traditional definition of life, the
surgeon who removes a beating heart for transplantation, upon a "pre-
mature" declaration of death, could be found to have committed a
"technical murder.' ' 117 To a lesser degree, perhaps, the surgeon who cuts
out the diseased heart of a recipient in such an operation might con-
ceivably be charged with criminal culpability upon the recipient's
death." 8 Under ordinary conditions the excision of the "failing heart"
116U.A.G.A. § 8 (c), which states: "A person who acts in good faith in accord
with the terms of this act on the anatomical gift laws of another state (or foreign
country) is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any
criminal proceedings for his act."
"'7The opinion was proffered by D. Louisell that a physician who withdrew the
mechanical supports or who removed a vital unpaired organ before conventional death
was committing an act of homicide. It has also been suggested that a possible prosecu-
tion for murder under such circumstances might be justified because the three re-
quirements for proving murder would be met: malice aforethought (or intent that
death should result), an act that resulted in death, and a lack of justification or ex-
cuse. D..Louisell, supra note 72, at 78, 98. See Fletcher, Prolonged Life, 42 WASH. L.
REv. 999, 1000, 1007 (1967) ; Taylor, A Gift of Life, 70 J. KAN. MED. SocY. 87 (1969).
118When is a Transplant a.Legal Murder, THIS WEEK, Nov. 17, 1968, at. 3.
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would be tantamount to killing. Here, even under the most optimum
clinical circumstances, the patient must be capable of retaining suf-
ficient vitality to withstand the rigors and demands of the most draco-
nian of operations. If either the graft or the patient's physical reserves
fail he will surely die. Thus, in effect, the surgeon will have killed him
by accelerating his demise, no matter how lofty the surgeon's motives in
trying to prolong life or to make it more satisfying. 119
The Potter case in England has been the subject of considerable
scholarly dispute and discussion in medical and legal circles. 1 0 In that
case, Potter, aged 32, had received severe head injuries (four skull
fractures and extensive brain damage) in a public-house brawl on
June 16, 1963, in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Fourteen hours after being
brought to the Newcastle General Hospital, he stopped breathing and
was then attached to a respirator for a period of 24 hours, during which
one of his kidneys was transplanted. The consent of his wife and the
attending coroner were obtained before the removal. On June 17, when
the respirator was turned off, there was no spontaneous heartbeat or
respiration. An inquest was held at which a pathologist testified that
death was due to the head injuries and that the extraction of the kidney
had nothing to do with the death. Another physician testified that he
thought that Potter died when he stopped breathing on June 16, "though
from a legal point of view he might have died when circulation ceased
and the heart stopped beating on the 17th." The coroner, who thought
that the patient was alive when the kidney was removed, stated that
his consent was based on the supposition that the organ would be
removed after death. They did not feel, however, that the physician
l19Acting to terminate life is first-degree murder. This is true regardless of
the motives of the actor. At one time in the evolution of the Common Law
of murder it might have made a difference whether a man was moved by
emotions of spite or by emotions of mercy. One speaks of the element of
emotions of spite or by emotions of "malice" in the Common Law definition
of murder. But, surely a man does not kill maliciously if he kills in order to
save another man from unbearable suffering. The concept of malice lost its
force in the evolution of the Common Law. As early as the 16th and 17th
Centuries it came to mean no more than the requirements that the killing be
intentional. Since a man killing for each reason of mercy does kill intention-
ally, he also kills maliciously - at least according to the special dictionary of
the law. Killing for reasons of mercy, like killing in order to rob one's victims,
is murder. But one should recognize that here statements of the law are a
statement of principle only. There is a gap between the law in theory and the
law in practice. That the legal norm is severe and uncompromising does not
mean that the people who administer the legal system are also severe and
uncompromising. Prosecutors or grand juries may fail to indict someone who
is clearly guilty of intentional euthanasia; judges and juries may acquit some-
one who is guilty on the facts (of technical homicide).
Apocrophal, TIME, Dec. 15, 1967, at 71. See also Robitscher, Changing Concepts of
Criminal Responsibility, LrGAL MFa. ANNUAL (1969).
1204 MED. Sci. L. 59 (1964).
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had committed any offense. It was apparently determined that the death
occurred on the 16th of June, though the conclusion was somewhat
ambiguous. No action was taken against the physician and the assailant
was convicted of manslaughter.-' The case once again emphasizes the
difficult problems associated with the dual concepts of death.
According to an analysis of the Potter case by Professor D. W. Elliott,
Solicitor of the Supreme Court and Dean of the Faculty of Law at
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 12 2 if a jury had found death to have
occurred on June 17, after the transplant, the consent of the wife would
have been invalid, since the kidney removal was of no therapeutic value
to Potter. Furthermore, since the patient died with the discontinuance
of the supporting apparatus, the surgeon would be guilty of homicide,
absent a recognition of euthanasia, as well as assault and battery. The
difficulty turned on justifying the use of the mechanical life supporter
after June 16, while contending that Potter died on the 16th. The
problems in this case obviously arose from the disagreement, though
tacit, as to the standard for determination of death. Evidently Professor
Elliott was refusing to accept the cerebral-death (irreversible coma)
concept.
A somewhat similar situation arose in Texas. There Dr. Joseph
Jachimczyk, the Chief Medical Examiner of Harris County, was con-
fronted with the problem of having to perform an autopsy on a homi-
cide victim, who had been a heart donor. After the operation the
coroner raised a question as to the establishment of the cause of death
of the victim. He questioned whether the examiner could complete his
report and testify in a competent manner at the accused-assailant's
trial if injuries to the body without the heart were insufficient to account
for death, and whether the assailant under such circumstances could be
convicted. 123 With this type of legal contretemps in view, committees
121M. HouTs & J. HUNT, supra note 92, § 1.06 at 1-59; Elkinton, The Dying
Patient, the Doctor, and the Law, 13 Va-L. L. Rav. 740 (1968); Halley & Harvey,
Medical and Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J.A.M.A. 423 (1968); Williams, Renal
Transplantation From Mortally Injured Man, 2 LANCET 294 (1963); Baker, supra note
40, at 85; Foreign Mail, 185 J.A.M.A. 993 (1963); Moment of Death, 2 BeT. MED. J.
394 (1963).
1224 MED. Scs. L. 77 (1964).
123The assailant was convicted of manslaughter. The decision possibly was based
on the principle of causation expressed in Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 769 (1965):
[W]ith respect to a mortal wound, that is, one which is necessarily fatal, the
same rule applies regardless of the jurisdiction, and it is well established that
the person who inflicted such an injury is criminally responsible for the death
of the injured person even though it immediately resulted from medical or
surgical treatment and regardless of whether such treatment was proper or
negligent, on the ground that the original wrongful act was the proximate
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composed of legislators and physicians in Texas recommended legislation
to amend the rules of evidence in criminal trials to make inadmissible
any evidence tending to show that the donor-victim's heart was still
beating when he was pronounced dead and his heart removed.124
Sweden's "Crafoord Case," which occurred in 1965 at the Karolinska
Institute, has also been the subject of a great deal of discussion because
it illustrates rather dramatically the "all hope is lost" approach to the
transplant donor's death, which has been a disturbing factor to some
moralists. In that case the donor, a woman of age 40, had suffered a
cerebral hemorrhage and was comatose. After her condition was pro-
nounced hopeless on the basis of a flat EEG (but before respiration
had ceased), the transplant was performed with her husband's consent.
She "died" in the respirator 2 days later following removal of her kidney.
The case provoked such controversy that it was investigated by the
disciplinary committe of the National Board of Health, the Attorney
General, and the Stockholm prosecuting attorney, to determine if legal
action was warranted. Professor Crafoord, chief of the Thoracic Clinic
and a distinguished Swedish heart-lung surgeon, assumed responsibility
and said that he and his staff had previously agreed that in a case
where the- chance of survival was, with 100 percent certainty, deemed
hopeless, a kidney could be removed. The reason, of course, was that
the chance of success of the transplant would be reduced if cessation of
heartbeat and respiration had to be awaited. Final disposition of the case
was apparently never reported, although the Royal Medical Board
found that death occurred when heart activity stopped. 125 Thus, para-
cause of death, the subsequent treatment with its attendant risks being fore-
seeable and a consequence of the original wrongful act.
Id; at 774.
It has been suggested, with some plausability, that should adherence to conventional
criteria of death be required the longer artificial life maintenance is continued the
more difficult it correspondingly becomes to establish causation. M. HourS & J. HuNT,
supra note 92, § 1.02 (3) at 1-19. See also Baker, supra note 40, at 85; MFD. TviB.,
May 13, 1968; MED. WoRLD NEWS, July 12, 1968, at 10; MED. WoRLD NEWS, May 24,
1968, at 11; N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1968, at 1, col. 8; N.Y. Times, May 13, 1968, at 18,
col. 3.
Donor May be Victim of Murder; Heart Transplant Called Off: Standard
University Hospital said Wednesday that plans for a heart transplant opera-
tion were abruptly called off when it was learned that the proposed donor's
death was under investigation as a possible murder . . . Authorities first be-
lieved he was under investigation as a possible murder . . . authorities first
believed he was under investigation as self-inflicted gunshot wound in the
head. But Butte County Sheriff's Capt. Richard Stanberg later advised Stanford
authorities that . . . had been booked on suspicion of attempted murder.
Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 24, 1970, at 24A.
124Baker, supra note 40, at 100.
12 5See Wasmuth & Stewart, supra note 12, at 467, 494.
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doxically, since the patient was alive her consent was necessary. In such
cases, under Swedish law consent of next of kin is unrecognized.
Though it would seem, as a practical matter, that a district attorney
is not likely to treat such activities as criminal, it must be conceded that
the potential for such action nevertheless exists. This was clearly demon-
strated in August, 1968, when two officials of Santa Clara, California,
a coroner and a county executive, requested the district attorney to de-
termine whether a criminal complaint could be issued against surgeon
Norman Shumway, who had transplated a heart into Leon Drake. The
officials charged that an autopsy was required to determine the cause of
death before any organs could be removed. The failure of the surgeon
and the hospital to notify the coroner until 3 hours after the operation
was one of their specific complaints. 126 Apparently, the district attorney
decided not to present their grievance to the Grand Jury as nothing
more was officially done about the matter. Irrespectively, the incident
shows that a criminal proceeding is a latent possibility and could be
converted into reality in the hands of a crusading or publicity-seeking
official.12 7 The outcome before a jury is, of course, highly proble-
matical and largely dependent upon the direction of public opinion
concerning such operations, which would presumably be an amalgam of
press indoctrination and public response to the progress or failure in the
future of these procedures.
CONCLUSION
Although the spectacular displays of the news media and the great
public interest generated therefrom have given transplant operations an
aura of a magical gift of life, they are in fact merely medical methods
of the most sophisticated kind and by their very nature attended by
the most awesome risks. Some of the major legal problems created by
outdated laws, however, have furtunately, been removed by the almost
unanimous adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, hopefully
leaving the transplant doctors to devote their best efforts to the per-
fection of a promising life preserving or prolonging technique. One of
the major problems, that of uncertainty of legal liability with respect
to donation of an organ at a critical period, has definitely been largely
alleviated. While the great publicity accompanying transplants may
encourage some surgical teams to undertake these operations when
126Arkansas Gazette, Aug. 24, 1968, at 3A.
127Sommer, supra note 74.
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professionally unprepared, most are apparently highly skilled and acting
with the noblest of intentions.
The eminent scholar and teacher, Wigmore, once reminded us that
"reverence for the memory of those who have departed does not require
us to abdicate the high duty of doing justice to the living,"128 It appears
that by acceptance of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, though con-
ceding some of its imperfections, we have indeed not abdicated that
high duty to ourselves or to society.
128J. WIGMom, EVIDENCE § 2221, at 196 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (3d ed. 1940).
